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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellants’ challenge to the Delaware title insurance 
program trenches on the challenge raised by other parties to 
the New Jersey title insurance program, a challenge that we 
rejected today in our opinion in In Re: New Jersey Title 
Insurance Litigation.  The same result follows here to the 
extent the analysis set forth here unavoidably duplicates that 
in In Re: New Jersey Title Insurance Litigation.   
 
I. 
 
Background 
 
Dawn McCray, William Williamson and Daralice 
Grayo (“Appellants”), on behalf of themselves and similarly 
situated consumers, appeal the District Court’s orders 
dismissing their federal antitrust claims against numerous 
Delaware title insurance companies (“Appellees”).  
Appellants assert that Appellees fixed the prices of title 
insurance in Delaware in violation of the Sherman Act and 
seek treble damages and injunctive relief.  The District Court 
held that Appellants’ claims are barred by the filed rate 
doctrine and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment with respect to the filed rate 
doctrine and hold that Appellants lack standing to seek 
injunctive relief.   
 
 Title insurers in Delaware are required to file their 
insurance rates with the state’s Department of Insurance 
(“DOI”).  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 2504(a) (2012).  
Insurers may comply with the state’s rate filing requirements 
through a licensed rating organization.  Id. §§ 2510-12.  
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Appellee title insurers are members of and file their rates 
through the Appellee Delaware Title Insurance Rating Bureau 
(“DTIRB” or “the bureau”), which is licensed by the DOI.  
“DTIRB claims to obtain, compile, and analyze statistical 
data from its members relating to their title insurance 
premiums, losses and expenses.”  J.A. at 216. 
 
Delaware insurers must propose their own “effective 
date” for new insurance rates.  Tit. 18, § 2504(a).  However, 
they must file those rates with the DOI Commissioner “not 
less than 30 days prior to the proposed effective date.”  Id. § 
2506(c). The Delaware Code requires the Commissioner to 
“review filings as soon as reasonably possible.”  Id. § 
2506(a).  The Commissioner must consider various factors to 
determine whether the rates comport with the law and ensure 
that the rates are not “excessive, inadequate or unfairly 
discriminatory.”  Id. § 2503(a).  Filings “shall be deemed to 
meet the statutory requirements unless disapproved by the 
Commissioner within 30 days.”  Id. § 2506(c).  If the 
Commissioner determines that “additional time is needed to 
review a rate filing,” s/he “shall . . . notify the filer that the 
review . . . shall be extended” and can extend the review up to 
ninety days, “unless the insurer . . . agree[s] to a longer term.”  
Id.  
 
   In addition to rates, the DOI typically requires 
insurers to “develop and file . . . advisory prospective loss 
costs and supporting actuarial and statistical data.”1
                                            
1 This directive is set forth in Department of Insurance 
Forms and Rates Bulletin No. 5.  Loss Cost Filing 
Requirements, Forms and Rates Bulletin No. 5 (Dep’t of Ins. 
amended Nov. 27, 1995), 
  J.A. at 
206.  Prospective loss costs are “the portion of a rate that does 
not include provisions for expenses (other than loss 
adjustment expenses) or profit, and are based on historical 
aggregate losses and loss adjustment expenses.”  Id.  At 
DTIRB’s request, the DOI temporarily exempted DTIRB’s 
http://delawareinsurance.gov/ 
departments/documents/ bulletins/formbull5.pdf [hereinafter 
Bulletin No.5].  The DOI Commissioner may issue orders, 
notices and bulletins regulating Delaware insurance practices.  
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 312(a)-(c).   
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members from its “prospective loss costs” and supporting 
data requirement.2
 
  In particular, the DOI recognized that 
“there is no credible historic data, particularly with regard to 
expenses, that the rating bureau could use in preparing the 
initial rates.”  J.A. at 137.  It therefore granted the bureau an 
“exception to the requirements of using the rating format (loss 
cost) prescribed in Bulletin No. 5.”  Id.  Nevertheless, the 
Commissioner required DTIRB to “have an approved 
statistical plan in place,” that would “enable the [DOI] to 
monitor rate adequacy,” id., which the bureau did until at 
least 2007.   
On October 15, 2008, Appellants filed a class action 
complaint, alleging that Appellees engaged in collective 
price-fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.3  
Appellants claim that Appellees used DTIRB as a vehicle for 
setting uniform rates, which “consist[] of costs unrelated to 
the issuance of title insurance, including kickbacks and other 
financial inducements title insurers provide to title agents” 
and other parties.  J.A. at 56.  Appellants allege that as a 
result, the title insurance market is non-competitive and 
dominated by a relatively small number of insurers.4
                                            
2 The exemption is set forth in Department of 
Insurance Forms and Rates Bulletin No. 27.  Title Insurance 
Filing Requirements, Forms and Rates Bulletin No. 27 (Dep’t 
of Ins. Sept. 2, 2010), 
  
Furthermore, Appellants assert that despite growing profits 
and efficiencies, Appellees’ rates have not changed since 
2004.   
http://delawareinsurance.gov/ 
departments/documents/bulletins/ formbull27.pdf [hereinafter 
Bulletin No. 27].  
 
3 Appellants also named Appellees’ parent companies 
as defendants and asserted an unjust enrichment claim.  The 
District Court dismissed that claim as well as the parent 
companies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
See McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d  
322 (D. Del. 2009).  Appellants do not pursue those claims on 
appeal. 
 
4 Appellees allegedly account for about 98 percent of 
the title insurance premiums paid in Delaware.   
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The District Court dismissed Appellants’ complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) but granted 
Appellants leave to amend their request for injunctive relief.  
Specifically, the court concluded that Appellants’ Sherman 
Act claim is barred by the filed rate doctrine, which precludes 
antitrust suits challenging rates currently filed with federal or 
state agencies.  McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 327 (citations 
omitted).  Because the doctrine does not bar certain injunctive 
relief claims, the Court granted Appellants leave to amend 
their complaint, as they “d[id] not describe in much detail the 
type of injunctive relief they [sought].”  Id. at 334.  
 
Appellants filed a nearly identical amended complaint, 
which the District Court also dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).  
The Court held that Appellants’ injunctive relief claim is 
barred by Section 1012(b) of the McCarran Ferguson Act, 
which exempts conduct from antitrust liability if it constitutes 
the “business of insurance” and is “regulated by state law.”  
See McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., No. 08-775, 2010 
WL 3023164 (D. Del. July 29, 2010).  The Court determined 
that Appellees’ conduct met both those requirements.  
Appellants appeal. 
 
II. 
 
Discussion 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367.  This court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and reviews de novo the District Court’s 
dismissal of Appellants’ initial and amended complaints.  
Utilimax.com, Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC, 378 F.3d 303, 
306 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 
A.  The Filed Rate Doctrine 
 
 Appellants argue that the District Court erred by 
applying the filed rate doctrine to dismiss their damages 
claims.5
                                            
5 Appellants also argue that District Court erred by 
applying the filed rate doctrine to dismiss their injunctive 
relief claim.  The District Court correctly observed that the 
  The District Court invoked the doctrine to dismiss 
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Appellants’ demand for: (1) “treble damages as provided by 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15,” and (2) the 
return of “overpayments made by [Plaintiffs and the Class] 
for defendants’ title insurance policies.”  J.A. at 65. 
 
Courts often trace the filed rate doctrine to Keogh v. 
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).  
In that case, a shipper alleged that certain railroad carriers 
conspired to fix freight transportation rates in violation of the 
Sherman Act.  Id. at 160-61.  The shipper sought damages 
based on the unusually high rates.  Id.  The Supreme Court, 
however, denied the shipper’s claim because the carriers had 
filed the challenged rates with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (“ICC”), which authorized them.  Id. at 162.  
The Court reasoned that it would be improper to hold carriers 
civilly liable for enforcing rates that the ICC had already 
approved as legal.  Id. at 162-63.  In addition, the Court 
expressed a concern about rate discrimination, stating that the 
shipper’s potential damages “might, like a rebate, operate to 
give him a preference over his trade competitors.”  Id. at 163.  
Finally, the Court considered the impracticability of awarding 
damages based on a lower hypothetical rate, which would 
require “reconstituting the whole rate structure”—a task that 
the Court viewed the ICC as more competent to handle.  Id. at 
164 (“[I]t is the Commission which must determine whether a 
rate is discriminatory; at least, in the first instance.”).  
 
 The Court re-examined the filed rate doctrine in 
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau Inc., 476 
U.S. 409 (1986).  In that case, various corporations alleged 
that the respondents conspired with their rate making bureau 
                                                                                                  
filed rate doctrine precludes injunctive relief to the extent that 
such relief “seeks to prevent the defendants from relying on 
the filed rate.”  McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 334; see 
Burlington N., Inc. v. United States, 459 U.S. 131, 138-42 
(1982) (vacating an injunction that ordered a reduction in 
rates).  Because Appellants did not clearly state the type of 
injunctive relief they sought in their initial complaint and 
requested only that the “unlawful conduct be enjoined,” J.A. 
at 65, the District Court properly dismissed the claim and 
granted Appellants leave to clarify their demand for relief.   
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to fix freight transportation rates in violation of the Sherman 
Act.  Id. at 410-11.  The petitioners sought treble damages 
based on the fixed rates.  Id. at 410.  They argued that “unlike 
Keogh, respondents’ rates . . . were not challenged in a formal 
ICC hearing,” thereby claiming that the agency’s approval 
was insufficient to trigger the filed rate doctrine.  Id. at 417; 
see also id. at n.19.  Rejecting that argument, the Court 
reasoned that respondents’ rates were “duly submitted, lawful 
rates under the Interstate Commerce Act in the same sense 
that the rates filed in Keogh were lawful.”  Id. at 417.  
Therefore, the Court concluded that “petitioners may not 
bring a treble-damages antitrust action.”  Id.  
 
 This court has recognized that the filed rate doctrine 
“bars antitrust suits based on rates that have been filed and 
approved by federal agencies.”  Utilimax.com, 378 F.3d at 
306 (3d Cir. 2004).  Other courts of appeals have also 
extended the doctrine to rates filed with state agencies.  See, 
e.g., Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 
1994) (“[C]ourts have uniformly held, and we agree, that the 
rationales underlying the filed rate doctrine apply equally 
strongly to regulation by state agencies.”); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. 
Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e see 
no reason to distinguish between rates promulgated by state 
and federal agencies.”).  Moreover, although the doctrine “has 
its origins in . . . cases interpreting the Interstate Commerce 
Act,” it “has been extended across the spectrum of regulated 
utilities.”  Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981). 
 
 Appellants argue that the filed rate doctrine does not 
apply to Delaware title insurance rates because the doctrine is 
limited to comprehensive regulatory regimes, such as the 
Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”).  Additionally, Appellants 
emphasize that the interstate commerce industry, among 
others, no longer requires rate filing and argue that such 
deregulation “weighs heavily against the district court’s first 
time extension of the doctrine to Delaware’s title insurance 
regime.”  Appellants’ Br. at 19.  However, the fact that one 
industry has been partially deregulated does not mean that the 
filed rate doctrine is no longer valid in other areas.  Because 
Appellants offer no authority to the contrary, their argument 
necessarily fails. 
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 Appellants further contend that the filed rate doctrine 
should not apply because “there is no clear repugnancy 
between the antitrust laws and Delaware’s title insurance 
regulations.”  Appellants’ Br. at 21.  That argument, however, 
is also meritless and requires little attention from this court.  
As the District Court observed, Appellants’ “repugnancy” 
argument relies on characterizing the filed rate doctrine as a 
complete bar against antitrust liability.  See McCray, 636 F. 
Supp. 2d at 328; see also Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound 
Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1966) (recognizing that 
collective ratemaking activities should not be immunized 
from antitrust scrutiny unless there is “plain repugnancy 
between the antitrust and regulatory provisions” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)).  But the doctrine itself 
does not eliminate “scrutiny under the antitrust laws by the 
Government and . . . possible criminal sanctions or equitable 
relief.”  Square D, 476 U.S. at 422.  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has stated that it “disagree[s]” with the “view 
that the issue in Keogh . . . is properly categorized as an 
‘immunity’ question,” thus making Appellants’ repugnancy 
argument inapplicable.  Id.; see also Essential Commc’ns 
Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 F.2d 1114, 1121 (3d Cir. 
1979) (“[T]he filed tariff doctrine does not confer immunity 
from antitrust liability generally.”). 
 
 Alternatively, Appellants argue that the filed rate 
doctrine does not apply because Delaware’s title insurance 
laws do not require the DOI to “meaningfully regulate title 
insurance rate filings.”  Appellants’ Br. at 22.  Appellees, on 
the other hand, argue that the filed rate doctrine is not limited 
to situations where the agency has meaningfully regulated or 
reviewed the challenged rates.  Moreover, even if there is 
such a requirement, Appellees argue that Delaware’s title 
insurance laws are comprehensive enough to warrant the 
doctrine’s application.   
 
 To support their “meaningful regulation” argument, 
Appellants rely on two Ninth Circuit cases—Wileman Bros. 
& Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1990), and 
Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 
1992).  In Wileman, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant 
competing fruit producers had issued unfair marketing 
standards without authorization from the Secretary of 
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Agriculture.  909 F.2d at 333.  Seeking to invoke the filed rate 
doctrine, the defendants argued that the Secretary “tacitly 
approved” the challenged standards because he never 
disapproved them and had the right to do so at any time.  Id. 
at 337.  However, the court reasoned that in Square D, 
“governmental approval was required before there could be 
any effect from the collective activity and it was such 
approval that legitimized the allotments and the rates.”  Id.  
The court also reasoned that the Secretary’s non-disapproval 
did “not guarantee any level of review” and was “equally 
consistent with lack of knowledge or neglect.”  Id. at 338.  It 
therefore refused to apply the filed rate doctrine and held that 
“[t]he mere fact of failure to disapprove . . . does not 
legitimize otherwise anticompetitive conduct.”  Id. at 337-38. 
 
 The Ninth Circuit went a step further in Brown.  There, 
the defendant title insurance companies actually filed their 
rates with regulatory agencies, but the law required “only 
‘non-disapproval’ of the rates” before they became effective 
“and d[id] not require compliance with strict guidelines.”  982 
F.2d at 394.  Relying on its holding in Wileman, the court 
refused to apply the filed rate doctrine.  The court reasoned 
that “[t]he absence of meaningful state review allows the 
[defendants] to file any rates they want.”  Id.  In addition, the 
court explained that if the challenged rates “were the product 
of unlawful activity prior to their being filed and were not 
subjected to meaningful review by the state, then the fact that 
they were filed does not render them immune from 
challenge.”  Id.  It therefore concluded that “the act of filing 
does not legitimize a rate arrived at by improper action.”  Id. 
 
 Appellants argue that Brown and Wileman, along with 
other district court cases, represent the correct approach to the 
filed rate doctrine—applying the doctrine only where 
agencies had to engage in meaningful review of the 
challenged rates.  Although Appellants do not indicate what 
level of review is necessary, they suggest that the doctrine, at 
a minimum, does not apply if “[r]ates are collectively set by 
the insurers themselves and automatically become effective 
unless disapproved by the agency.”  Appellants’ Br. at 22.   
 
Despite Brown and Wileman, the Supreme Court has 
never indicated that the filed rate doctrine requires a certain 
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type of agency approval or level of regulatory review.  
Instead, the doctrine applies as long as the agency has in fact 
authorized the challenged rate.6
                                            
6 Appellants argue that interpreting the filed rate 
doctrine as lacking a “meaningful review” requirement would 
eradicate the state action doctrine.  Under the state action 
doctrine, private entities participating in state-administered 
price regulation can assert antitrust immunity if, inter alia, 
“the State provides active supervision of anticompetitive 
conduct undertaken by private actors.”  FTC v. Ticor Title 
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992).  Therefore, “[t]he mere 
potential for state supervision” is not sufficient to invoke the 
state action doctrine.  Id. at 638.  However, there is no 
apparent requirement to reconcile the filed rate and state 
action doctrines, as courts have generally applied them 
independently.  See, e.g., Trigen-Okla. City Energy Corp. v. 
Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 
2001) (dismissing claims under state action doctrine and as a 
result declining to reach filed rate doctrine); City of Kirkwood 
v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1182 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(independently analyzing the filed rate doctrine and the state 
action doctrine).  Moreover, the doctrines do not completely 
overlap because the filed rate doctrine, unlike the state action 
doctrine, does not provide complete immunity from antitrust 
liability.  See Essential Commc’ns, 610 F.2d at 1121.    
  As the District Court 
observed, the relevant statute in Keogh only required common 
carriers to provide ten days public notice before charging new 
rates, and did not require the ICC to expressly approve such 
rates before they went into effect.  See 24 Stat. 381-84 (49th 
Cong. Feb. 4, 1887).  Similarly, the statute in Square D did 
not require the ICC to affirmatively approve freight 
transportation rates.  See Square D. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff 
Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1349 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(characterizing the central issue as “whether Keogh . . . has 
been overruled so far as its language extends to rates filed 
with but not investigated and approved by the [ICC]”).  
Square D also endorsed the appellate court’s statement that 
the doctrine applies “‘whenever tariffs have been filed.’”  
Square D, 476 U.S. at 417 n.19 (citation omitted); see also 
Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 
246, 251 (1951) (holding that the petitioner “can claim no rate 
as a legal right . . . other than the filed rate, whether fixed or 
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merely accepted by the [Agency] Commission”).  Finally, the 
First Circuit has held that the filed rate doctrine only requires 
rates to be filed, not affirmatively approved or scrutinized.  
See Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 
419 (1st Cir. 2000) (“It is the filing of the tariffs, and not any 
affirmative approval or scrutiny by the agency, that triggers 
the filed rate doctrine.”). 
 
Indeed, neither this court nor the Supreme Court has 
suggested that a distinction should exist between agency 
authorization through “approval” or “non-disapproval” of 
filed rates.  Moreover, in this case such a distinction would be 
meaningless because the DOI was required to review the 
challenged rates.  Delaware law states that “[t]he 
Commissioner shall review filings as soon as reasonably 
possible after they have been made in order to determine 
whether they meet the [statutory] requirements.”  Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 18, § 2506(a).  Further, the Commissioner must 
consider various factors to make sure rate filings are not 
“excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.”  Id. § 
2503(a).  Therefore, even though rate filings are “deemed to 
meet the statutory requirements unless disapproved by the 
Commissioner within 30 days,” the Commissioner is required 
to review the rates during that period and may extend the 
review if “additional time is needed.”7
 
  Id. § 2506(c).   
 Appellants next argue that the filed rate doctrine 
should not apply because Appellants cannot obtain retroactive 
relief directly from the DOI.  To support this argument, 
Appellants rely on a series of “price squeeze” cases, which 
                                            
7 Appellants suggest that the DOI could not genuinely 
review the challenged rates because DTIRB did not provide 
sufficient data to support its filings.  However, Appellants do 
not provide any authority showing that the filed rate doctrine 
is dependent on the thoroughness of an agency’s fact-finding.  
See Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 402 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that the doctrine should not 
apply where agencies “rarely exercise their muscle and thus 
give no meaningful review to the rate structure”).  
Additionally, since filing its rates in 2004, DTIRB has 
provided a statistical plan that enables the DOI to monitor the 
bureau’s rate adequacy.   
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hold that the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable if a single 
regulator does not have authority over the challenged rates 
and thus cannot grant full relief.  See, e.g., City of Kirkwood, 
671 F.2d at 1178-79; Borough of Lansdale v. PP & L, Inc., 
503 F. Supp. 2d 730, 740-42 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Yet, as the 
District Court held, those cases are irrelevant because the 
DOI is “fully empowered to regulate the one rate at issue.”  
McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 331.  Moreover, Appellants fail 
to present any authority showing that plaintiffs must have 
access to an alternative regulatory remedy before courts may 
apply the filed rate doctrine.8
 
   
Finally, Appellants argue that the filed rate doctrine 
does not apply because Appellees’ filings do not comply with 
Delaware law.  The filed rate doctrine applies to rates 
“properly filed with the appropriate . . . regulatory authority.”  
Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577.  The Supreme Court 
explained the properly filed requirement in Security Services, 
Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. 431 (1994).  In that case, the 
petitioner—a corporation that agreed to deliver goods for 
Kmart—sued Kmart to enforce the petitioner’s filed delivery 
rates.  The Court, however, held that the rates were 
unenforceable, see id. at 444, because they had become “void 
as a matter of law under the Interstate Commerce 
Commission’s regulations,” id. at 433.  The Court reasoned 
that the petitioner’s rates were “incomplete” and therefore 
“insufficient to support a reliable calculation of charges.”  Id. 
at 443.  More precisely, the rates included per mile delivery 
prices, but relied on an outside source to “calculat[e] charges 
                                            
8 Indeed, Appellants concede that “cases have noted 
that the availability of an alternative regulatory remedy is not 
a ‘prerequisite’ for application of the filed rate doctrine.”  
Appellants’ Br. at 28 n.9 (citing Wegoland, Ltd. v. NYNEX 
Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).  And in any 
event, Delaware allows interested parties to challenge 
insurance rates by making written application to the 
Commissioner for an administrative hearing.  The 
Commissioner will determine if a hearing is justified, after 
which the Commissioner may deem the filings “no longer 
effective.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 2520(a)-(c).  At oral 
argument, counsel for Appellants conceded that they did not 
administratively challenge DTIRB’s rates.   
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for a given shipment.”  Id. at 433.  Because that source was 
no longer available to the petitioner, the Court concluded that 
the rates were missing an “essential element,” id. at 440, and 
were thus void, see id. at 443-44. 
 
 Although we have not yet interpreted Kmart, other 
courts have understood the decision to mean that the filed rate 
doctrine does not apply where: (1) “there is an absence of a 
calculable rate,” Whitaker v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 88 F.3d 952, 961 
(11th Cir. 1996); or (2) the rates are void per se under a 
statutory or regulatory scheme, see Norwest  Transp., Inc. v. 
Horn’s Poultry, Inc., 37 F.3d 1237, 1239 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(finding Kmart inapplicable because the regulations at issue 
did not “make the previously filed tariffs void”); see also 
Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 
989 F.2d 281, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying both factors).   
 
 According to Appellants, the filed rate doctrine should 
not apply under Kmart because Appellees’ filings “lack 
essential cost data,” which is required under the DOI’s 
regulations.  Appellants’ Br. at 32.  The DOI typically 
requires insurers to “file . . . prospective loss costs” and 
supporting data along with their proposed rates.  Bulletin No. 
5.  However, the DOI waived that requirement with regard to 
Appellees’ first rate filings.  Bulletin No. 27.  Because 
Appellees never filed additional rates, Appellants assert that 
the challenged rates no longer conform with the DOI’s 
regulations, making the filed rate doctrine inapplicable.  In 
response, Appellees contend that their failure to file 
additional rates does not show that the existing “rates were 
not properly filed” because the DOI “waived loss cost 
requirements for DTIRB’s initial rate filing.”9
                                            
9 Appellees also argue that the DOI’s supporting data 
requirement governs “filings by rating bureaus for lines of 
insurance other than title insurance.”  Appellees’ Br. at 7 n.3.  
However, nothing in Bulletin No. 5 indicates that the 
regulation is limited to certain types of insurance.  See 
Bulletin No. 5 (stating that the bulletin applies generally to 
“participating insurers”). 
  Appellees’ Br. 
at 38 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
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   Appellees’ rates do not fall under the Kmart improper 
filing exception.  First, Appellants do not claim that 
Appellees’ filings make it impossible for consumers to 
calculate the chargeable rates.  See Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. at 
443.  To the contrary, in their complaint, Appellants provide a 
detailed explanation of DTIRB’s title insurance rates and 
state that “[t]hese uniform rates are set forth in DTIRB’s 
rating manual and on many of defendants’ websites.”  J.A. at 
222.  In addition, there is no indication that DTIRB’s rates are 
void per se under a statutory or regulatory scheme.  See 
Norwest Transp., Inc., 37 F.3d at 1239.  Although the DOI 
usually requires insurers to accompany their rates with 
“prospective loss costs” and supporting data, the DOI waived 
that requirement with respect to Appellants’ first rate filing 
and was permitted to do so under Delaware law.  See Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 18, § 2505 (“[T]he Commissioner may, by 
written order, suspend or modify the requirement of filing as 
to any kind of insurance . . . ”).10
                                            
10 At oral argument, counsel for Appellant argued that 
Appellees’ rate filings are invalid because the Appellees 
jointly formulated the proposed rates even though Bulletin 
No. 5 required each insurer to “individually determine and 
file the rates it will use as a result of its own independent 
company decision-making process.”  Bulletin No. 5. 
However, Bulletin No. 27 “allow[ed] an exception to the 
requirements of using the rating format (loss cost) prescribed 
in Bulletin No. 5,” which necessarily included the directive to 
individually determine and file rates.  Bulletin No. 27.  
Indeed, the DOI issued Bulletin No. 5 in order to “specif[y] 
the framework under which . . . insurers . . . will operate in a 
loss cost system.”  Bulletin No. 5.  Because that system was 
temporarily lifted in Bulletin No. 27, Appellants cannot rely 
on its requirements to insist that Appellants’ rate filings are 
improper.  In addition, title 18, section 2501 of the Delaware 
Code states that, among other things, “[t]he purpose of this 
chapter is to . . . authorize and regulate cooperative action 
among insurers in rate making.”      
  Furthermore, by requiring 
Appellees to “have an approved statistical plan in place” that 
will “enable the [DOI] to monitor rate adequacy,” Bulletin 
No. 27, the DOI complied with its statutory duty to “require 
the insurer to furnish the information upon which it supports 
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the filing.”  Tit. 18, § 2504(b).  Overall, Appellees have 
“properly filed” their rates with the “appropriate . . . 
regulatory authority,” thus justifying the District Court’s 
application of the filed rate doctrine.11
 
   Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 
U.S. at 577. 
B.   Policies Underlying the Filed Rate Doctrine 
 
         In their reply brief, Appellants argue that the policies 
underlying the filed rate doctrine do not require its application 
in this case.  Although we have generally held that “[a]n 
appellant waives an argument in support of reversal if he does 
not raise that argument in his opening brief,” AT & T v. FCC, 
582 F.3d 490, 495 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 
131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011), it is well settled that “where an 
appellee raises a[n] argument not addressed by the appellant 
in its opening brief, the appellant may reply.”  Bennett v. 
Tucker, 827 F.2d 63, 69-70 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987). This court 
may thus consider Appellants’ policy argument because 
Appellees raised it for the first time in their brief.   
                                            
11 Appellants also argue that the Kmart improper filing 
exception applies because: (1) the DITRB’s filings include 
hidden costs based on “kickbacks and other inducements 
unrelated to the business of insurance,” Appellants’ Br. at 32 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); and (2) the 
Tenth Circuit addressed a similar situation in TON Services, 
Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 493 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2007), and 
refused to apply the filed rate doctrine, see Appellants’ Br. at 
33.  These arguments are meritless.  With regard to 
Appellants’ “hidden costs” argument, it is well established 
that “there is no fraud exception to the filed rate doctrine.”  
AT & T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 535 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  Thus, the fact that Appellees allegedly hid 
expenses and engaged in other fraudulent conduct does not 
make the doctrine inapplicable.  Furthermore, Appellants’ 
second argument is unpersuasive both because TON Services 
is non-binding authority and because the insurers in that case, 
unlike Appellees, failed to file new rates and failed to file 
supporting data for existing rates absent legal permission 
from the regulating agency.  See 493 F.3d at 1237. 
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The filed rate doctrine is designed to advance two 
“companion principles”: (1) “preventing carriers from 
engaging in price discrimination as between ratepayers,” and 
(2) “preserving the exclusive role of . . . agencies in 
approving rates . . . by keeping courts out of the rate-making 
process,” a function that “regulatory agencies are more 
competent to perform.”  Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 
58 (2d Cir. 1998).  These “companion principles” are often 
called the “nondiscrimination strand” and the 
“nonjusticiability strand.”  Id.  The “nonjusticiability strand” 
recognizes that “(1) legislatively appointed regulatory bodies 
have institutional competence to address rate-making issues; 
(2) courts lack the competence to set . . . rates; and (3) the 
interference of courts in the rate-making process would 
subvert the authority of rate-setting bodies and undermine the 
regulatory regime.”  Sun City Taxpayers’ Assoc. v. Citizens 
Utils. Co., 45 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1995).  The 
“nondiscrimination strand” recognizes that “victorious 
plaintiffs would wind up paying less than non-suing 
ratepayers.”  Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21.   
 
 Appellants argue that the nonjusticiability strand does 
not compel the doctrine’s application in this case.  More 
precisely, Appellants claim that nonjusticiability concerns 
arise only “when there is an active regulator.”  Reply Br. at 6.  
Here, Appellants claim that the DOI neither “sets the rates nor 
exercises any meaningful review of the rates.”  Id.  Thus, they 
contend that the District Court would not interfere with “the 
regulatory authority of the DOI” by awarding damages based 
on hypothetical legal rates.  Id. at 7.  Appellees assert that 
such a damage award would implicate the nonjusticiability 
strand because it would “second-guess the [DOI’s] 
specialized knowledge.”  Appellees’ Br. at 27. 
 
 The nonjusticiability strand supports the doctrine’s 
application in this case.  In their initial complaint, Appellants 
requested treble damages and “returned overpayments” based 
on Appellees’ allegedly inflated title insurance rates.  J.A. at 
65.  To award such damages, the District Court would have to 
calculate the legal rate but for DTIRB’s antitrust violations.  
That task alone is enough to implicate the nonjusticiability 
principle, which is primarily concerned with preventing 
courts from engaging in the ratemaking process.  See, e.g., 
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Montana-Dakota Utils., 341 U.S. at 251 (finding that it is not 
“open to the courts to determine what the reasonable rates 
during the past should have been”).  In addition, the District 
Court’s interference in the rate making process would 
“subvert the authority” of the DOI by second-guessing its rate 
determination, thus further implicating the nonjusticiability 
strand.  Sun City Taxpayers’ Assoc., 45 F.3d at 62. 
 
 The nondiscrimination strand, on the other hand, is not 
implicated by Appellants’ claims.  Appellants brought the 
underlying suit on behalf of “themselves and all others 
similarly situated.”  J.A. at 45.  Accordingly, it is unlikely 
that a victory would allow Appellants to pay less than other 
ratepayers.  See Square D, 476 U.S. at 423 (noting that “the 
development of class actions . . . might alleviate the . . . 
concern about unfair rebates”); Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 22 
(“[C]oncerns for discrimination are substantially alleviated in 
[a] putative class action.”).  Nonetheless, we hold that the 
filed rate doctrine applies to Appellants’ claims based on the 
nonjusticiability principle alone.  See Marcus, 138 F.3d at 59 
(stating that the doctrine applies “whenever either the 
nondiscrimination strand or the nonjusticiability strand . . . is 
implicated”).     
 
C.  Standing 
 
            With respect to Appellants’ injunctive relief claims, 
they argue that the District Court erred by concluding that 
Appellees’ “actions are statutorily exempt from antitrust 
liability pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”12  
Appellants’ Br. at 35.  We will not reach this issue because 
Appellants lack standing to seek injunctive relief.13
                                            
12 The filed rate doctrine does not bar injunctive relief 
claims with respect to future rates.  See Square D, 476 U.S. at 
422 & n.28 (noting that the filed rate doctrine precludes 
antitrust claims for treble damages); Phillip E. Areeda & 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust 
Principles and Their Application ¶ 247d (3d ed. 2006) 
(“[T]here is no reason to think Keogh would prohibit an 
injunction against an antitrust violation attending some tariff 
that would or might be filed in the future.  Such a tariff has 
not been ‘filed’ at all.”).  However, the McCarran-Ferguson 
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 “Absent Article III standing, a federal court does not 
have subject matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff’s claims, 
and they must be dismissed.”  Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. 
Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).  Article III 
standing requires “(1) injury-in-fact, which is an invasion of a 
legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”  Danvers Motor Co., Inc. 
v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005).  
“Allegations of ‘possible future injury’ are not sufficient to 
satisfy Article III.”  Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  Instead, “‘[a] threatened 
injury must be certainly impending,’ and ‘proceed with a high 
degree of immediacy.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  In the context 
of class actions, Article III standing “is determined vis-a-vis 
the named parties.”  Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 
F.3d 283, 306 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
 Appellants lack standing to seek injunctive relief 
because they failed to allege an injury-in-fact.14
                                                                                                  
Act exempts conduct from antitrust liability if it: (1) 
constitutes “the business of insurance,” (2) is “regulated 
pursuant to state law,” and (3) does not “constitute acts of 
boycott, coercion or intimidation.”  Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. 
FTC, 998 F.2d 1129, 1133 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
  In their 
 
13 Although Appellees do not address standing, “we 
are required to raise issues of standing sua sponte if such 
issues exist.”  Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citing FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Court of 
Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1996)).  
 
14 When reviewing a complaint for standing, we 
determine “whether the allegations on the face of the 
complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the 
[court’s] jurisdiction.”  Reilly, 664 F.3d at 41 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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amended complaint, Appellants “challenge[d] the defendants’ 
collective price-setting of rates . . . as per se illegal price-
fixing” and sought “injunctive relief . . . due to the significant 
threat of future losses and injuries resulting from those 
antitrust violations.”  J.A. at 213.  However, Appellants did 
not indicate when such “future losses and injuries” will occur.  
Instead, they vaguely alleged that “[a]s a proximate result of 
defendants’ unlawful conduct, plaintiffs and the Class will 
suffer future loss or damages in that they will be required to 
pay supra-competitive prices for title insurance policies.”  
J.A. at 230.  Those allegations, taken as true, do not indicate 
that a named party has “actual or imminent” plans to purchase 
title insurance.  Nor do they establish that DTIRB intends to 
file new rates in the future.15
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
  On the contrary, Appellants 
state in their amended complaint that “[t]here is a remarkable 
absence of rate changes by title insurers over the past several 
years,” and “Defendants’ current rates, for example, have 
been in place since February 2004 without any change.”  J.A. 
at 225.  Therefore, because it is “merely speculative” that 
Appellants’ injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision,” we lack appellate jurisdiction to address 
Appellants’ injunctive relief claims. 
III.  
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s orders.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
15 DTIRB’s current rates do not constitute a legal 
injury under the filed rate doctrine.  Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163 
(stating that “[u]nless and until suspended or set aside, th[e 
filed] rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate”); see also 
Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 18 (“[T]he doctrine holds that any ‘filed 
rate’ . . . is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial 
proceedings brought by ratepayers.”).  Thus, Appellants must 
establish standing based on the possibility of future unfair 
rates. 
